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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This case arises out of a decision by Connecticut 
General Life Insurance Company (“CIGNA”), as the third-
party administrator of “The Lucent Technologies, Inc. Long 
Term Disability Plan for Management or LBA Employees” 
(the “Plan”),1
 
 to deny Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc. (“Lucent”) 
employee Robert Funk’s claim for long-term disability 
benefits under the Plan.  Funk challenged that decision in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (“ERISA”).  The District Court granted summary 
judgment for Funk on both his claim for long-term disability 
benefits and on CIGNA’s counterclaim under ERISA to 
recover overpaid benefits.   
CIGNA and the other appellants appeal from that 
decision and order.2
 
  For the following reasons, we will 
vacate the District Court’s order and remand with respect to 
CIGNA’s denial of benefits, and we will reverse the District 
Court’s order with respect to CIGNA’s counterclaim for 
overpaid benefits.  
                                              
1 In their briefs, the parties identify CIGNA Group 
Insurance as the Plan administrator.  (See Appellants’ 
Opening Brief at 3; Appellee’s Answering Brief at 1.)  The 
Plan itself, however, states that the “Administrator for the 
Plan is Connecticut General Life Insurance Company 
(CIGNA).” (App. 2 at 178.) 
2 For ease of reference, we will refer to all of the 
appellants collectively as “CIGNA.”    
4 
 
I. Background 
 
 A. The Parties And The ERISA Plan At Issue 
 
Funk worked as a member of Lucent’s technical staff.3
 
  
At all times relevant to this appeal, he was a participant in 
Lucent’s Plan, which was governed by ERISA and self-
funded by Lucent through a trust.  CIGNA administered the 
Plan.  As Plan administrator, CIGNA had “full discretionary 
authority and power to … determine eligibility for [Plan] 
benefits [and] to interpret and construe the terms and 
provisions of the [Plan].”  (App. 2 at 585.)  
Pursuant to the Plan, a participant could be eligible to 
receive long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits after he had 
received short-term disability benefits for 26 weeks.  The 
Plan provided LTD benefits in two phases.  Phase one began 
immediately after the 26-week short-term disability period 
and ran for one year.  To receive LTD benefits for that one-
year period, the putatively disabled participant had to show 
that he was  
 
prevented by reason of such disability, other 
than accidental injury arising out of and in the 
course of employment of the Company, from 
engaging in his … occupation or employment at 
the Company, for which the Eligible Employee 
is qualified, based on training, education or 
experience.  
                                              
3 Funk’s job involved testing computer software and 
hardware as part of product development.   
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(App. 2 at 167.)  However, for a Plan participant to receive 
LTD benefits beyond the one-year period, i.e., to move on to 
phase two, CIGNA, “in [its] sole opinion [as] the [Plan] 
Administrator,” had to be persuaded that the participant was  
 
incapable of performing the requirements of any 
job for any employer for which the individual is 
qualified or may reasonably become qualified 
by training, education or experience, other than 
a job that pays less than 60 percent of the 
Eligible Employee’s Eligible Pay that would 
have been in effect on the day preceding the day 
that the Eligible Employee’s Short Term 
Disability Benefits ceased.  
(Id.)   
 
The Plan also provided that LTD benefits could be 
reduced by certain offsets, including Social Security disability 
benefits.  Pursuant to the Plan, “[a]ny retroactive award of 
Social Security benefits which covers any portion of the 
period for which Plan benefits have been paid shall be 
considered as an offset of such Plan benefits and be payable 
to [CIGNA] by the recipient.”  (App. 2 at 172.)  
 
B.    CIGNA’s Denial Of Funk’s Claim For Phase 
Two LTD Benefits 
 
On December 7, 2004, Funk began a leave of absence 
due to depression and related disorders.  In August 2005, after 
receiving short-term disability benefits for 26 weeks, Funk 
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applied to CIGNA for LTD benefits.4  In support of his 
application, Funk submitted a claim form and the treatment 
records from his mental healthcare providers, Dr. Pinchuck, 
his psychiatrist, and Mr. Libby, his psychotherapist.5
 
  Funk’s 
submissions indicated that he had a history of alcohol abuse 
and had been experiencing stress from his financial situation 
and his relationship with his wife.  Pinchuck’s and Libby’s 
treatment notes described Funk as suffering from, among 
other things, depression, anxiety, and paranoia.  The notes 
indicated that Funk had difficulty concentrating, making 
decisions, and otherwise performing daily tasks.  Both 
Pinchuck and Libby opined that Funk was unable at that time 
to return to work in his former position.   
 CIGNA forwarded Funk’s treatment records to Dr. 
Mohsin Qayyum for independent review.  Qayyum opined 
that the information provided to him supported the conclusion 
that, “due to severe psychiatric symptoms[,]” Funk could not 
return to work.  (App. 2 at 436.)  Accordingly, Funk was 
awarded LTD benefits for a one-year period retroactive to 
June 28, 2005.     
 
                                              
4 It is undisputed that Funk was an “Eligible 
Employee” under the Plan and that his eligible pay prior to 
the date of his disability was $78,100.   
5 Funk also listed Drs. Katz and Lederich as treating 
physicians, but they treated, respectively, chronic headaches 
and sleep difficulties, and neither provided information that 
the parties treat as significant to Funk’s claim that he was 
unable to work.   
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In June 2005, Funk executed an agreement providing 
that his LTD benefits under the Plan were to be reduced by 
any Social Security benefits he ultimately received and that 
he would reimburse CIGNA “for any LTD overpayment … 
that may occur as a result of” having received Social Security 
benefits.  (App. 2 at 566.)  In August 2005, he executed a 
similar agreement (together with the June 2005 agreement, 
the “Reimbursement Agreements”).   
 
 In January 2006, CIGNA notified Funk that it would 
again be reviewing his case to determine if he would remain 
eligible for benefits beyond the phase one period.  The review 
required Funk to complete a disability questionnaire and to 
provide current treatment information from his mental 
healthcare providers.   
 
Funk submitted the questionnaire, listing bad tremors, 
lack of concentration, tiredness, short-term memory loss, 
aggression, depression, and paranoia as reasons why he could 
not return to work.  Libby provided notes from therapy 
sessions, including observations that Funk’s relationship with 
his wife had improved, that he was “communicating his 
feelings much clearer,” that he had “been able to use the skills 
learned in session to manage his depression – which is now 
under control,” and that he had “continue[d] to improve but 
need[ed] regular sessions [and] proper med[ication] to avoid 
regression.”  (App. 2 at 426.)  Libby also reported that Funk 
was still suffering from confusion, depression, helplessness, 
and hopelessness and could not at that time return to work.  
Pinchuck did not provide updated treatment notes, stating that 
they were “sent before” and that “you can’t read my 
handwriting anyway.”  (App. 2 at 374.)  He instead provided 
an updated evaluation of Funk, which indicated that Funk was 
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not abusing substances and that he exhibited fair judgment 
and insight along with “grossly intact” cognition.  (Id. at 375.)  
However, Pinchuck also indicated that Funk still suffered 
from depression and anxiety, scored a 40 on the Global 
Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”)6
 
, exhibited limited 
capacity to socialize and perform daily tasks, and was unable 
to return to work.   
 CIGNA again enlisted Qayyum to independently 
review Funk’s claim.  On August 15, 2006, after reviewing 
Funk’s supplemental information, Qayyum issued a report 
concluding that, while the records showed Funk to be 
suffering from psychiatric symptoms, they did not show that 
those symptoms were severe or that he had “severe functional 
limitations in … psychosocial domains.”  (Id. at 367.)  Given 
that, and considering Funk’s “fair insight and judgment,” 
“grossly intact” cognition, and within-normal-limits “thought 
process and content,” (id.) Qayyum opined that the “entirety 
… of [the] available information [did] not provide evidence 
                                              
6 The GAF is a numeric rating used by mental health 
practitioners to measure the functional impairment of a 
patient on a 0-100 scale in accordance with the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.  See AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 34 (4th ed., 2000).  A score 
of 40 represents “[s]ome impairment in reality testing or 
communication (e.g., speech is at times illogical, obscure, or 
irrelevant) OR major impairment in several areas, such as 
work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood 
(e.g., depressed man avoids friends, neglects family, and is 
unable to work …).”  Id.  
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of psychiatric functional impairment to preclude” (id. at 368) 
Funk from working.     
 
On August 16, 2006, the day after issuing his report, 
and after having made several unsuccessful attempts to 
contact Pinchuck for a peer-to-peer discussion about Funk, 
Qayyum finally spoke with Pinchuck.  During that 
conversation, which Qayyum later memorialized in notes, 
Pinchuck suggested that Funk might be able to work in a 
“menial job, such as mopping floors or working at a post 
office at night.”  (Id. at 363.)  Qayyum declined to speculate 
as to a suitable vocation but responded, echoing his report, 
that Funk was not “functionally impaired from working in a 
supportive, low stress, low cognitive demand environment,” 
as evidenced by, inter alia, his ability to use a computer and 
daily check his email.  (Id.)   
 
Also during that conversation, Pinchuck revealed that 
he had referred Funk to a neuropsychologist, Dr. Robert 
Pancza, for an evaluation in March 2006.  Pancza’s 
evaluation, the results of which Pinchuck later faxed to 
Qayyum, consisted of a battery of tests administered over two 
days.  From that evaluation, Pancza observed: 
 
[Funk] was pleasant and cooperative throughout 
th[e] examination.  An appropriate amount of 
effort was applied to all tasks, without any signs 
of frustration.  There was no noted tendency 
toward mental fatigue, distractibility, 
impulsivity, or lapses in concentration.  All 
instructions were understood without difficulty.  
There were no indications that any affective 
factors, including anxiety or depression, were 
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present at a level sufficient to diminish his 
functional level during the course of th[e] 
examination.  Mood was noted to be normal and 
affect was well modulated throughout th[e] 
examination. 
(Id. at 355.)  The test results indicated that Funk enjoyed 
average to high function in most cognitive areas.  
Summarizing the evaluation, Pancza stated: 
 
[T]here is a disparity between [Mr. Funk’s] self-
report of everyday cognitive functioning and the 
objective results of this examination.  There is a 
growing body of research that has indicated that 
individuals who are depressed often 
significantly underestimate the quality of their 
cognitive functioning.  Such appears to be the 
case for Mr. Funk.  …  [I] … reassured [Mr. 
Funk] about being capable of performing 
occupational activities based solely upon his 
current cognitive abilities.    
(Id. at 357.) 
 
 On August 22, 2006, CIGNA notified Funk via letter 
that he was no longer disabled as defined under the Plan and 
so would not receive further LTD benefits.  Explaining its 
decision, CIGNA acknowledged Pinchuck’s opinion that 
Funk still suffered from depression, bi-polar disorder, 
anxiety, and paranoia and so was unable to work.  However, 
it noted Pinchuck’s observations that, as of July 25, 2006, 
Funk was “alert and oriented” and exhibiting “good” 
behavior, that he had thought process and content “within 
normal limits,” had “fair” judgment and insight and “grossly 
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intact” cognition, and had stopped drinking alcohol.  (Id. at 
358-59.)  Echoing Pinchuck’s opinion, CIGNA noted that 
Funk’s “ongoing severe depressive symptoms” made it 
difficult to get “a clear picture of [Funk’s] cognitive 
problems” but noted too that Panzca’s testing revealed “no 
gross cognitive defects.”  (Id. at 359.)  Finally, CIGNA noted 
that Funk was able daily to use a computer to check email.  
From the foregoing, CIGNA concluded that “there is no 
clinical evidence to support that [Funk] would be unable to 
work in a supportive, low stress, low cognitive demand 
environment.”  (Id.)  CIGNA closed the letter by informing 
Funk of his right to administratively appeal the decision and 
to include additional information for CIGNA to consider.7
 
   
   Funk appealed to CIGNA for further review of his 
case.  He contended that Qayyum’s report and notes, which 
CIGNA cited in denying benefits, were at odds with the 
medical documentation provided by Pinchuck and Libby.  
Funk also noted that CIGNA failed to perform any sort of 
vocational assessment to determine whether he could, in his 
mental condition, “reasonably become qualified by training, 
education or experience, and earn 60% of his pre-disability 
pay,” (id. at 316) which, Funk contended, not only made 
hollow CIGNA’s conclusion that he “[was] not functionally 
impaired from working in a supportive, low stress, low 
cognitive demand environment,” but also constituted 
noncompliance with the terms of the Plan, since “disability” 
                                              
7 It appears that CIGNA, in denying benefits, had 
reviewed Qayyum’s summary of his conversation with 
Pinchuck, in which the Pancza evaluation was discussed, but 
had not reviewed the Pancza evaluation itself. 
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under the Plan could only be determined in light of a 
vocational assessment (id. at 315).     
 
Funk included as additional information in support of 
his appeal a letter from the Social Security Administration 
that indicated that his application for disability benefits was 
being reviewed and that, based on the submitted information, 
Funk appeared to “need help managing [his] money and 
meeting [his] daily needs.”  (Id. at 317.)  Funk subsequently 
supplied a medical questionnaire completed by Libby on 
February 11, 2007, indicating that Funk’s GAF score was 
45/50,8
 
 that his response to treatment over the last three years 
had been “fair to poor,” that his decision-making, stress 
tolerance, and performance were hindered by confusion, 
fatigue, dysphoric mood, and depression, that he had 
“marked” functional limitation in daily activities, social 
functioning, and concentrating, and that “at present [his] 
depressive symptoms hinder sustained, gainful employment.”  
(Id. at 304, 306-07, 309.)  Nevertheless, Libby also indicated 
in the questionnaire that, contrary to the Social Security 
Administration’s opinion, Funk “[could] … manage benefits 
in his … own best interest.”  (Id. at 309.)  
                                              
8 That GAF score represents “[s]erious symptoms 
(e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent 
shoplifting) OR any serious impairment in social, 
occupational or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to 
keep a job).” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 34 (4th ed., 
2000). 
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 In January 2007, while his appeal to CIGNA was 
pending, Funk was awarded Social Security disability 
benefits, retroactive to June 1, 2005.  That retroactive Social 
Security award created a period in which Funk received both 
Social Security and LTD benefits, meaning that, under the 
Plan, he had been overpaid and was obligated to reimburse 
CIGNA the overpaid amount, which was $24,817.  Funk paid 
CIGNA $18,500, but spent the remaining $6,317 on ordinary 
living expenses.  Despite notice from CIGNA, Funk did not 
pay the balance owed. 
 
Having received Funk’s additional submissions in 
support of his appeal, CIGNA forwarded all of the medical 
documentation that had previously been submitted with 
Funk’s claim to Dr. Stuart Shipko for an independent review.  
After reviewing those records, Shipko concluded that Funk’s 
medical history did not support any restrictions or limitations 
on his working.  Shipko opined that Pinchuck’s assessment 
“lack[ed] credibility,” citing two reasons.  (Id. at 299.)  First, 
Shipko believed that Pinchuck had, in his phone conversation 
with Qayyum, mischaracterized Pancza’s neuropsychological 
testing.  In particular, Shipko was troubled that Pinchuck had 
said the test results did “not provide a clear assessment of 
[Funk’s] cognitive problems due to [Funk’s] ongoing severe 
depressive symptoms” and that follow-up testing was needed, 
despite Pancza having stated in his report that “emotional 
factors were not causing any cognitive impairment … [or] 
interfering with effort or testing of cognition in any manner.”  
(Id. at 298.)  Second, according to Shipko, Pinchuck had 
“indicate[d] that [Funk] ha[d] marginal cognitive abilities,” 
had “poor grooming and hygiene,” and was “still severely 
depressed,” though Pancza had stated in his report that Funk 
“was pleasant and cooperative throughout his examination,” 
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“had a normal mood and affect,” and applied “an appropriate 
amount of effort … [without a] tendency toward mental 
fatigue, distractibility, impulsivity or lapses in concentration.”  
(Id. at 298-99.)   
 
Shipko similarly criticized Libby’s opinion that Funk 
could not work, observing that it was at odds with Libby’s 
own treatment notes, which, Shipko said, “indicate[d] that 
depression is under control and d[id] not indicate that [Funk] 
[was] reporting any problems with cognition or serious 
symptoms of depression.”  (Id. at 299.)  Shipko also noted 
that Libby conducted no formal cognition tests and that his 
report was inconsistent with Pancza’s evaluation.  Shipko 
closed his review thusly:  “Available information does not 
support an inability to work in any occupation for which he is 
suited.”  (Id. at 300.)  
 
CIGNA subsequently denied Funk’s appeal.  Citing 
Shipko’s and Pancza’s evaluations, and giving no “deference 
to prior reviews,” CIGNA noted that Pinchuck’s and Libby’s 
opinions were at odds with their own treatment notes and 
Pancza’s evaluation.  (Id. at 289.)  CIGNA concluded that it 
had “not received medical information demonstrating a 
severity in [Funk’s] condition supporting restrictions 
preventing [him] from performing [his] own or any 
occupation.”  (Id.)  
 
 Funk again appealed within CIGNA, this time 
submitting a copy of Shipko’s report marked up with Libby’s 
handwritten comments.  Libby noted errors he believed 
Shipko had made in chronicling Funk’s treatment and opined 
that Pancza’s evaluation was misleading because it was done 
in a controlled environment and that Funk’s then-current 
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status did not support Shipko’s conclusion that Funk was able 
to work.   
 
 On February 6, 2008, CIGNA issued a final decision 
denying Funk’s LTD claim.  Noting in particular a lack of 
clinical evidence or documentation to support Libby’s 
opinion, CIGNA stated that it “had not been provided with 
the clinical evidence to support a physical or psychiatric 
functional loss which would preclude [Funk] from performing 
his regular occupation.”  (Id. at 186.)   
 
C.    Proceedings In The District Court  
 
On October 22, 2008, having exhausted his 
administrative appeals, Funk sued CIGNA pursuant to 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), seeking under ERISA to overturn 
CIGNA’s denial of LTD benefits.  CIGNA countersued 
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), seeking under ERISA to 
recover from Funk the remaining $6,317 of overpaid LTD 
benefits.  The parties filed cross motions for summary 
judgment, and, on August 30, 2010, the District Court granted 
Funk’s motion and denied CIGNA’s.  With respect to the 
denial of benefits, the Court held that CIGNA had acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously because, as an initial matter, it had 
failed to assess whether Funk was disabled as defined under 
the Plan; that is, it had failed to assess whether Funk could 
work in a job that would pay him 60% of his former wage (a 
“60% job”), given the restrictions identified in CIGNA’s 
initial denial (low stress environment, etc.).  In the alternative, 
the Court held that CIGNA’s denial of benefits was not 
supported by substantial evidence as set forth in Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008), because 
CIGNA had (1) failed to reconcile its decision with the Social 
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Security Administration’s award of disability benefits; (2) 
given greater weight to non-treating physicians’ opinions 
without explanation; (3) issued the initial denial without 
having reviewed Pancza’s report; (4) confused cognition with 
mental illness in determining Funk’s ability to be productive 
at work; and (5) exhibited a financial conflict of interest in 
administering the Plan.  With respect to CIGNA’s 
counterclaim for recoupment of overpaid benefits, the Court 
held that an equitable lien over the Social Security funds, 
which is the relief CIGNA sought, was not possible here since 
those funds had been dissipated prior to suit and could not be 
traced.   
 
CIGNA’s timely appeal to us followed.   
 
II. Standard of Review9
 
 
 “Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and if, viewing the facts in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Smathers v. Multi-
Tool, Inc./Multi-Plastics, Inc. Emp. Health & Welfare Plan, 
298 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2002).  Applying that standard, we 
exercise plenary review of a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  Id.   
 
In determining whether benefits under a plan governed 
by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) were properly denied, we 
                                              
9 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e).  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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review for abuse of discretion.10
 
  Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); Glenn, 554 U.S. at 
115-17.  Because “benefits determinations arise in many 
different contexts and circumstances, … the factors to be 
considered [in reviewing a plan administrator’s exercise of 
discretion] will be varied and case-specific.”  Estate of 
Schwing v. The Lilly Health Plan, 562 F.3d 522, 526 (3d Cir. 
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  While a plan 
administrator’s potential conflict of interest may be among 
those case-specific factors, courts should not give that factor 
undue weight but should instead treat it as one of the several 
factors that may be relevant in the case.  See id. (instructing 
that courts should “take account of several different 
considerations of which a conflict of interest is one, and reach 
a result by weighing all of those considerations” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  A court may overturn a plan 
administrator’s determination “if it is without reason, 
unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter 
of law.”  Doroshow v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 574 
F.3d 230, 234 (3d Cir. 2009).  A decision is also subject to 
judicial correction when the plan administrator has failed to 
comply with the procedures required by the plan.  Abnathya 
v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 41 (3d Cir. 1993), 
abrogated in part on other grounds by Glenn, 554 U.S. at 
112.   
                                              
10 “In the ERISA context, the arbitrary and capricious 
and abuse of discretion standards of review are essentially 
identical.”  Miller v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 632 F.3d 837, 845 n.2 
(3d Cir. 2011). 
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III. Discussion 
 
 This appeal raises the question of whether CIGNA 
complied with its own Plan and relied on substantial evidence 
in denying LTD benefits to Funk.  It also requires us to 
address whether CIGNA may assert an equitable lien on 
Funk’s Social Security benefits such that it may recoup an 
overpayment of benefits.  We discuss each of those issues in 
turn. 
 
 A. CIGNA’s Denial Of LTD Benefits 
 
The District Court held that CIGNA abused its 
discretion in denying Funk phase two LTD benefits because 
CIGNA failed to comply with the Plan in determining 
“disability” and because its decision, which did not give 
proper consideration to the evidence and was infected by a 
conflict of interest, was not supported by substantial 
evidence.  We disagree with the former conclusion and 
cannot accept the District Court’s analysis as to the latter. 
 
 1. Whether CIGNA Complied With the Plan    
 
The District Court concluded that, because CIGNA’s 
decision did not explicitly address salary or provide examples 
of suitable alternative 60% jobs, CIGNA failed to comply 
with the Plan provision requiring it to determine whether 
Funk was “incapable of performing the requirements of any 
job for any employer … for which the individual is qualified 
or may reasonably become qualified … , other than a job that 
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pays less than 60 percent [of his former pay].”11
                                              
11 The District Court’s opinion appears to focus on 
CIGNA’s initial decision rather than its final decision.  For 
example, the District Court, in holding that CIGNA had failed 
to comply with the Plan, highlighted CIGNA’s failure to 
identify a 60% job that Funk could do, given his work 
limitations, even though the final decision indicates that Funk 
has no work limitations.  Similarly, the District Court 
criticized CIGNA for basing its decision on Funk’s “intact 
computational skills” without explaining how those skills 
qualify him for a 60% job, even though the final decision 
made no mention of those skills.  The Court’s emphasis was 
misplaced. 
  (App. 2 at 
167.)  CIGNA argues that it was not required to explicitly 
A plan administrator’s final, post-appeal decision 
should be the focus of review.  See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2560.503-1(h) (requiring that claimants subject to adverse 
benefit determinations be provided with a “reasonable 
opportunity” to appeal that adverse decision); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2560.503-1(h)(2)(i)-(ii) (requiring that claimant be provided 
appropriate notice and an opportunity to submit 
documentation and evidence supporting his or her claim); 29 
C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(2)(iv) & (3)(ii) (requiring that the 
plan administrator’s review must “take[] into account all 
[additional information] … without regard to whether such 
information was submitted or considered in the initial benefit 
determination,” “not afford deference to the initial adverse 
benefit determination,” and be “conducted by an appropriate 
named fiduciary of the plan who is neither the individual who 
made the adverse benefit determination that is the subject of 
the appeal, nor the subordinate of such individual”).  To focus 
elsewhere would be inconsistent with ERISA’s exhaustion 
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discuss salary and alternative 60% jobs because it had 
authority under the Plan to reasonably interpret Plan 
provisions, and it was reasonable to interpret the Plan as not 
requiring an analysis of alternative 60% jobs when it had 
determined that Funk could return to his former job.   
 
ERISA plans commonly grant authority to plan 
administrators to interpret the plan’s terms.  Goldstein v. 
Johnson & Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 441 (3d Cir. 2001).  Even 
so, plan administrators do not have unfettered discretion in 
undertaking that task. 
 
                                                                                                     
requirement.  See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 
552 U.S. 248, 258-259 (2008) (noting that claimants must 
“exhaust the administrative remedies mandated by ERISA 
§ 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133, before filing suit under 
§ 502(a)(1)(B)”); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Price, 501 
F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) (similar).  
A court may of course consider a plan administrator’s 
pre-final decisions as evidence of the decision-making 
process that yielded the final decision, and it may be that 
questionable aspects of or inconsistencies among those pre-
final decisions will prove significant in determining whether a 
plan administrator abused its discretion.  See, e.g., Miller, 632 
F.3d at 855-56 (considering unexplained inconsistencies 
between a plan administrator’s initial and final disability 
determinations as a factor suggesting an abuse of discretion).   
In those instances, however, the pre-final decisions ought 
merely to inform a court’s review of the final decision.  See 
generally id.      
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If the terms are unambiguous, then any actions 
taken by the plan administrator inconsistent 
with the terms of the document are arbitrary.  
But actions reasonably consistent with 
unambiguous plan language are not arbitrary.  If 
the reviewing court determines the terms of a 
plan document are ambiguous, it must take the 
additional step and analyze whether the plan 
administrator’s interpretation of the document is 
reasonable. 
Bill Gray Enters., Inc. Emp. Health & Welfare Plan v. 
Gourley, 248 F.3d 206, 218 (3d Cir. 2001); see also McElroy 
v. SmithKline Beecham Health & Welfare Benefits Trust Plan 
for U.S. Emps., 340 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding 
that plan administrator was authorized to interpret plan 
language that was “equivocal”). 
 
 Regardless of CIGNA’s characterization of what it did 
here, it does not appear that it interpreted ambiguous Plan 
terms.  Indeed, the Plan’s requirements for determining phase 
two disability appear to be clear and thus unsuited to any 
further interpretation.  The issue, then, is whether CIGNA 
acted “reasonably consistent with” those requirements.  
Gourley, 248 F.3d at 218.  In our view, it did.  The Plan 
required CIGNA to determine whether Funk was capable of 
working in any job that would pay him 60% of his former 
pay.  CIGNA literally complied with that requirement when it 
determined that Funk could, without restrictions, “perform[] 
his regular occupation” (id. at 186), i.e., his former job at 
Lucent.  It went without saying that his former job could be 
understood to pay 100% of his former wage.  Moreover, 
because CIGNA’s determination that Funk was not disabled 
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did not turn on the existence of an alternative 60% job, it was 
unnecessary to discuss in its decision any alternative 60% 
jobs.  CIGNA’s decision was therefore reasonably consistent 
with the Plan, and the District Court’s contrary holding was in 
error.12
 
 
2. Whether Substantial Evidence Supported 
CIGNA’s Decision 
 
 In the alternative, the District Court concluded that 
CIGNA’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence 
because it did not give proper consideration to the evidence 
and was infected by a conflict of interest.  Regarding the 
latter point, the Court stated that CIGNA “exhibited a 
financial conflict of interest in the way that the plan for 
Lucent was administered.”  (App. 1 at 11.)  The Court 
reasoned that because CIGNA was a claim administrator 
operating in a competitive market, it labored under a conflict.  
Citing Glenn, the District Court said, “if a company is a claim 
administrator that offers itself to self-funded plans in a 
competitive market, then its incentive is to keep claims down 
to be more attractive to potential plans,” which incentivizes 
the claim administrator to “over-deny claims.”  (Id. at 11-12 
n.12.)   
 
That analysis, however, does not take full account of 
the Supreme Court’s instructions in Glenn.  A party’s status 
                                              
12 Even if we were to consider CIGNA as having 
engaged in Plan interpretation, rather than straightforward 
Plan execution, the same rationale supports the conclusion 
that CIGNA’s interpretation was reasonable. 
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as a third-party plan administrator does not automatically 
encumber it with a material conflict of interest.  While the 
Supreme Court in Glenn did say that, “for ERISA purposes a 
conflict exists” when a third-party plan administrator operates 
in a competitive market for the delivery of such services,13
 
 
the Court also acknowledged that the conflict may be of little 
or no practical significance.  See 554 U.S. at 114-15 
(explaining that, while a plan administrator may have a 
conflict of interest by virtue of its participation in a 
competitive market, a court “can nonetheless take account of 
the circumstances … which … diminish[] the significance or 
severity of the conflict in individual cases” (emphasis 
original)).   
Here, as even Funk rightly and frankly acknowledged 
at oral argument, there is nothing to suggest that CIGNA was 
laboring under a meaningful conflict of interest.  Thus, the 
District Court should not have given the significant weight it 
appeared to give to a largely hypothetical conflict.  Because 
we cannot be sure of the extent to which the District Court’s 
weighing of that factor affected the Court’s holding, we will 
remand the case for a reevaluation of CIGNA’s claim 
                                              
13 “For one thing,” the Glenn Court said, “the 
employer’s own conflict may extend to its selection of an 
insurance company to administer its plan.  An employer 
choosing an administrator in effect buys insurance for others 
and consequently (when compared to the marketplace 
customer who buys for himself) may be more interested in an 
insurance company with low rates than in one with accurate 
claims processing.”  Glenn, 554 U.S. at 114. 
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decision in light of the other factors cited by the District 
Court. 
 
 B. Recouping Overpayment 
 
We now turn our attention to CIGNA’s counterclaim 
seeking recoupment of overpaid LTD benefits.  Under 
ERISA, a fiduciary may bring a civil action “(A) to enjoin 
any act or practice which violates any provision of this 
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other 
appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or 
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms 
of the plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).  However, a fiduciary 
may only seek relief under § 1132(a)(3) if the relief sought 
falls within “those categories of relief that were typically 
available in equity,” Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., 
Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 361 (2006) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (emphasis original), and “the basis for its claims is 
equitable,” id. at 363.  CIGNA here seeks equitable relief to 
enforce provisions of the Plan and the related Reimbursement 
Agreements.   
 
In Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 
U.S. 204 (2002), an insurer that had paid medical bills for an 
insured who had been injured in a car accident sought, 
pursuant to a plan provision that reserved “a first lien upon 
any recovery … that the beneficiary receives from [a] third 
party,” id. at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted), 
reimbursement from the insured after she recovered in tort for 
her injuries, id. at 207-09.  The Supreme Court rejected the 
insurer’s claim, explaining that the relief sought could not be 
categorized as equitable unless the insured possessed the 
particular property to which the lien would attach at the time 
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relief was sought.  Because the settlement funds over which 
the insurer sought to impose a lien were in a trust, not in the 
insured’s possession, the insurer’s claim failed.  Id. at 213-14.  
In those circumstances, the Court explained, the insurer was 
effectively seeking recovery from the insured’s general 
assets, which made the relief sought legal, not equitable, and 
thus impermissible under § 1132(a)(3).  Id. at 214.   
 
  Subsequently, in Sereboff, the Supreme Court held an 
insurer’s claim for reimbursement was permissible under 
§ 1132(a)(3), despite quite similar facts.  As in Knudson, the 
insurer in Sereboff sought to recoup medical expenses from 
an insured who had received a tort settlement.  Sereboff, 547 
U.S. at 359.  The insurer relied on a plan provision requiring 
the insured to “‘reimburse [the insurer]’ for [medical] benefits 
from ‘[a]ll recoveries from a third party (whether by lawsuit, 
settlement, or otherwise).”  Id.  In Sereboff, though, the funds 
upon which the insurer sought to impose a lien were in the 
insured’s investment accounts, and so were still in the 
insured’s possession.  Id. at 362-63.  The Court identified that 
fact as a meaningful basis for distinguishing Knudson, 
explaining that the “impediment to characterizing the relief in 
Knudson as equitable [was] not present,” id. at 362, because 
the insurer in Sereboff was seeking “to recover a particular 
fund from the [insured],” id. at 363.   
 
The Court in Sereboff described the insurer’s claim as 
reflecting an equitable lien “by agreement” – that is, a lien 
arising out of an agreement to convey ownership of specific 
property to one party as soon as the counterparty gets title to 
the property.  Id. at 363-65 (citing Barnes v. Alexander, 232 
U.S. 117, 121 (1914)).  The insurance plan provision 
requiring reimbursement gave rise to such a lien.  Id.  When 
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there is an equitable lien by agreement, the Court said, the 
lien “follow[s]” the contracted-for property “into the 
[counterparty’s] hands,” i.e., it attaches to the specified 
property “as soon as [the property] [is] identified.”  Id. at 364.  
Consistent with that operation, the Court observed, “the fund 
over which [an equitable] lien [by agreement] is asserted need 
not be in existence when the contract containing the lien 
provision is executed.”  Id. at 366.  Moreover, the Court said, 
there is no “tracing requirement” for an equitable lien by 
agreement.  Id. at 365.  Property to which the lien attached 
may be converted into other property without affecting the 
efficacy of the lien.  See id. (observing that the property at 
issue in Barnes had been converted into other property 
without disturbing the equitable lien by agreement).14
 
   
In the present case, Funk argues that, because the 
funds upon which CIGNA sought to impose the lien – the 
Social Security award – were no longer in his possession, the 
District Court correctly followed Knudson and rejected 
                                              
14 The Supreme Court’s description of equitable liens 
by agreement in Sereboff as laying claim to property not yet 
in possession and remaining valid even if the later acquired-
property is converted strongly implies that, in that context and 
contrary to the Court’s discussion in Knudson, the defendant 
need not possess the property at the time relief is sought in 
order for the relief to be equitable – any post-agreement 
possession will suffice.  See generally Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 
361-366 (recognizing that equitable liens by agreement 
operate where property is not yet in defendant’s possession 
and where property was in defendant’s possession and then 
converted). 
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CIGNA’s claim for an equitable lien.  If, however, there was 
an equitable lien by agreement that attached to the Social 
Security award as soon as Funk received it, dissipation of the 
funds was immaterial.  CIGNA asserts that it has an equitable 
lien by agreement, citing the Plan and the Reimbursement 
Agreements as agreements identifying specific funds (the 
Social Security award) and a particular share of those funds 
(the amount of overpayment) to which its lien attached.   
 
Considering the Plan and the Reimbursement 
Agreements, we believe that CIGNA has the better of those 
arguments.  The Plan provides that a Social Security offset 
“shall be … payable … by the recipient.”  (App. 2 at 172.)  
Likewise, the Reimbursement Agreements provide, 
respectively, for “reimburse[ment] … for any LTD 
overpayment” (id. at 566 (June 22, 2005 agreement)) and 
“reimburse[ment of] the full amount of any overpayment” (id. 
at 531 (August 13, 2005 agreement)).  The Supreme Court in 
Sereboff held that language specifying a right to 
reimbursement from “[a]ll recoveries from a third party 
(whether by lawsuit, settlement, or otherwise)” was sufficient 
to create an equitable lien by agreement.  547 U.S. at 359, 
369 (internal quotation marks omitted).   Because the Plan 
and Reimbursement Agreements at issue here likewise 
specify the receipt of Social Security benefits as the particular 
fund from which reimbursement is to be made, they give rise 
to an equitable lien by agreement over those Social Security 
funds that are overpayments under the Plan.15
                                              
15 We acknowledge that the Plan and the 
Reimbursement Agreements, beyond providing that receipt of 
a Social Security award triggers the obligation to reimburse 
the amount of any overpayment, could have been clearer in 
  Thus, the relief 
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CIGNA seeks is appropriate under § 1132(a)(3), and Funk 
must reimburse the $6,317 yet due and owing to CIGNA from 
the overpayment.    
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order with respect to CIGNA’s denial of benefits, 
reverse the District Court’s order with respect to CIGNA’s 
counterclaim, and remand the case to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                                                                     
specifying that reimbursement must come out of or from the 
Social Security award.  However, in light of the language 
found sufficient in Sereboff, we have little trouble concluding 
that the language here was sufficiently specific regarding 
Social Security awards to create an equitable lien by 
agreement.    
